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Abstract 
This paper outlines a solution to what can be called “the problem of 
domination by reason”, “conceptual domination” or “clarificatory 
injustice”. This problem relates to situations where a philosopher may 
appear to be in a position to legitimately coerce, by means of arguments, 
an interlocutor, who shares with the philosopher a concept or a conceptual 
system, to accept a philosophical characterization of a concept or whatever 
the concept concerns. The proposed solution is based on a particular 
interpretation of what Wittgenstein means by agreement in his later 
philosophy, when he says that philosophy only states what anyone grants 
to it. Wittgenstein’s view and the proposed solution are characterized by 
their continued recognition of the value of logic and reason, truth and 
knowledge, as opposed to attempting to solve the problem by embracing 
relativism and questioning the value of the logic, reason, truth and 
knowledge. Relevant kind of disagreements licence no relativistic 
conclusions, because problems relating to them can be solved without 
going this far. 
 
1. The problem of injustice and domination by reason 
One of the most common claims made by philosophers is that they 
will (intend or want to) clarify something. A much more contested issue 
is whether and how often they actually manage to clarify what they set 
out to clarify, either to themselves or others. In connection with such 
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clarifications, or attempts to clarify, a problem arises which we might 
call “the problem of domination by reason”, “the problem of 
conceptual domination” or “the problem of clarificatory injustice”. 
The problem can be described as follows. Assuming that the 
philosopher and her interlocutor share a common system of concepts 
or that they both partake in reason, the philosopher seems to be 
sometimes in a position, due to her more advanced capacity or skill to 
clarify those shared concepts or principles of reason, to coerce or force, 
by means of arguments, the interlocutor to accept against her will 
philosophical clarifications (for example, conceptual definitions). 
Problematically, nothing seems to exclude the possibility that in such a 
case the interlocutor would be wrongly made to accept a merely alleged 
clarification that does not really reflect her concepts or thinking, but 
distorts them. Thus, the philosopher might end up, regardless of good 
and honest intentions, doing injustice to the interlocutor’s thinking.1 
This problem of injustice and domination by reason arises 
especially in the context of conceptions of philosophy which assume 
that the philosopher’s task is to articulate universal or exceptionless 
theses of essence (concerning the non-accidental features of the 
objects of investigation) or universally or exceptionlessly valid 
conceptual determinations that cover all instances falling under a 
concept. Here an important tacit assumption is made about conceptual 
unity or the unity of cases sharing an essence, according to which it is 
always possible to give an overarching definition or determination of a 
concept or essence in terms of features common to all cases falling 
under the concept that covers all possible instances of the concept’s 
application. However, this assumption is problematic in that, insofar 
as it is not part of the concept of concept that concepts necessarily 
possess this kind of simple unity, agreement between the philosopher 
and the interlocutor on a conceptual clarification regarding some cases 
                                                          
1 Throughout this discussion I will assume that the philosopher, in giving such arguments, is 
engaged in what might be called “immanent critique” of the interlocutor’s concepts or language 
use. She is not trying to impose on the interlocutor a system of concepts or beliefs that the 
interlocutor does not already share with her, but the problem concerns the misrepresentation 
of those shared concepts. The philosopher’s argument is therefore assumed to be non-
dogmatic in the sense of Kant, proceeding from within shared concepts or principles of reason, 
and not relying on anything to which the interlocutor is not already committed. For Kant’s 
notion of dogmatism and Wittgenstein’s broader notion of the same, see Kuusela 2008 and 
2008a. 
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falling under a concept does not automatically imply an agreement 
regarding other cases falling under the same concept. But evidently, 
simple conceptual unity is not a necessary feature of concepts, as 
shown by there being no contradiction in the description of other more 
complex modes of conceptual unity.  
I give three examples for illustration. 1) Wittgenstein’s account of 
family-resemblance concepts, whereby conceptual unity is determined 
through criss-crossing similarities. Schematically, this allows two 
different kind of cases to fall under the same concept, despite their not 
sharing any features, as long as they share features with a third kind of 
case that unites the two cases as an intermediary (PI: §65ff.). 2) 
Concepts expressed by what J. L. Austin calls “dimension-words”, 
characteristic of which is that they have multiple different opposites. 
Austin example is “real” whose contrasts include “fake”, “artificial”, 
“copy”, “makeshift”, “imaginary”, and so on, and which can be taken 
to mean something different depending on what it is contrasted with 
(Austin 1962: 71). 3) Nietzsche’s genealogical account of morality as a 
multi-layered construct, whereby the concepts of good and evil reflect 
their complex history of formation, and incorporate different, even 
incompatible elements and considerations that derive from what 
Nietzsche describes as the morality of the nobles and slaves (Nietzsche 
2008). Given the possibility of this kind of conceptual complexity, 
philosophical clarification can readily fail to do justice to the thinking 
and concepts of the philosopher’s interlocutor, insofar as such 
clarifications assume simple conceptual unity, but the interlocutor’s 
concepts possess a more complex unity. Evidently, agreement about 
how to characterize or define a certain type of case that falls under a 
particular concept does not here guarantee the applicability of the same 
characterization or definition to other cases falling under the same 
concept. 
I agree that the feeling of injustice being done to one’s thinking or 
concepts can accurately reflect the situation. Given the possibility of 
preceding kind of conceptual complexity, clarificatory injustice in the 
sense of conceptual domination or domination by reason can readily 
occur. Problematically, however, the possibility of this kind of 
clarificatory injustice seems to have led to responses in certain quarters 
of philosophy and cultural studies that put into question the value of 
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the notions of reason, logic, knowledge and truth, which are 
consequently regarded as instruments of domination and oppression 
rather than as necessary for emancipation and liberation in the sense in 
which both ancient and enlightenment philosophy have regarded them 
as necessary for freedom. Sometimes this may have led to the 
acceptance of relativism, and sacrificing the notions knowledge, truth, 
and/or logic, perhaps thus pushing us towards something like an era 
of post-truth, whatever that would mean. Arguably, however, such a 
response is problematic – an unnecessary overkill. To be sure, if there 
is no objective truth or knowledge and no principles of reason or logic, 
then the philosopher cannot tell others what the objective truth is and 
what the principles governing reason are, or force them to accept and 
comply with the philosopher’s an account of such things. However, 
overthrowing the notions of truth, knowledge, reason and logic seems 
an unacceptably high price to pay for solving the problem of 
domination by reason, conceptual domination or clarificatory 
injustice.2 I am inclined to think that this response merely constitutes a 
tempting confusion, although I will not try to argue so. Nevertheless, 
one may certainly wonder whether justice and freedom are possible at 
all without truth, knowledge, reason and logic. (Is it possible to be free 
without a correct understanding of one’s situation?) I would therefore 
like to outline a different solution to the problem. 
As I will explain, there is a way to construe Wittgenstein’s notion 
of agreement in philosophy that can solve the problem of domination 
by reason and clarificatory injustice without our being forced to 
abandon reason, logic, knowledge and truth, and without our being led 
to relativism or to deny the value of reason, logic and truth. On the 
proposed interpretation of the notion of agreement in Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy, philosophy can involve no attempt to try to force anyone 
to accept anything. 
 
 
                                                          
2 It may be that the kind of relativism imagined here is merely a popular post-modern fiction 
or a creature of university politics in the US. There are rumours of philosophers holding such 
a view, but I have yet to identify any serious philosopher who would do so. Ultimately nothing 
depends on this, however. The problem of domination by reason and clarificatory injustice is 
real, and calls for a solution. For varieties of relativism, see Haack 1998 and Hales 2011.  
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2. The Wittgensteinian solution 
According to Wittgenstein (PI: §599), “Philosophy only states what 
everyone grants to it.” Various readings of this remark have been 
offered, including a reading by Anthony Kenny according to which 
Wittgenstein’s claim cannot be taken seriously in that the only thing 
that can be agreed upon in Wittgenstein’s writings are uninteresting 
trivialities, while anything of philosophical interest is controversial 
(Kenny 2004). According to a somewhat different interpretation put 
forward by Hans-Johann Glock, and agreed upon by Peter Hacker and 
the influential scholar-duo Baker and Hacker (see below), 
Wittgenstein’s remark is to be read as stating that there is something, 
namely Wittgensteinian grammatical rules or statements thereof that 
philosophy spells out, and which everyone who participates in and 
shares certain linguistic or conceptual practices must grant to it and 
accept. As Glock explains, “we should expect” “a universal assent” to 
such grammatical statements (Glock 1991: 79). 
It is notable how this account that the philosopher is able to tell her 
interlocutors what they must accept or otherwise suffer irrationality 
exhibits certain key features of the very view of the philosopher’s role 
that raises the problem of domination and injustice. Analogously to the 
traditional philosopher’s comprehension of essences or shared 
principles of reason, for Glock it is the philosopher’s superior 
understanding of grammatical rules and statements that puts her in the 
position of intellectual power.  Once such a rule is agreed upon at some 
point of a discussion as capturing the interlocutor’s use of relevant 
linguistic locutions, the philosopher is, according to this view, licensed 
to apply it also to further cases that may arise without having to consult 
the interlocutor, thus being able to demonstrate to the interlocutor that 
what she is saying is inconsistent or makes no sense. As Glock explains, 
“the special function of grammatical reminders is to draw attention to 
the violation of linguistic rules by philosophers, a violation that results 
in nonsense” (Glock 1991: 78; original italics).  
 It may be granted that mere deviance from ordinary linguistic practice does 
not constitute a philosophical mistake. But the idea is to demonstrate a 
certain kind of inconsistency in the philosophical positions or questions 
attacked, an inconsistency concerning the uses of words (Glock 1991: 84; original 
italics).  
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In this way we can construe arguments which “philosophers will have 
to accept” (Glock 1991: 86). 
But if language and our concepts are complex enough not to fit 
neatly any such systems of rules that we might spell out with the 
purpose of clarification, as Wittgenstein arguably maintains (PI: §§81–
83), a philosopher with Glock’s approach seems to be at risk of doing 
injustice to her interlocutors. For clearly, in inferring from the 
interlocutor’s agreement at a certain juncture of a discussion that she 
uses language according to such and such rules to the allegedly 
necessary-to-accept conclusion that she has fallen into nonsense or 
inconsistency at some other point, Glock is assuming that the 
Wittgensteinian philosopher is able to establish some definite set of 
rules which the interlocutor must stick to so as to speak sense. 
Otherwise the interlocutor could conceivably sometimes respond, 
“Yes, those rules that I agree on apply here, but not there, in these 
further cases”, and the damning conclusion would not be necessary to 
accept, after all. Similarly to Glock, also Baker and Hacker maintain 
that it is not possible to disagree with the philosopher’s statement of a 
grammatical rule. Whoever disagrees is either failing to make sense or 
is using their words in a new meaning which is irrelevant to the 
philosophical issue under discussion (Baker and Hacker 1980: 490–
491; cf. Hacker 2001: 333, 335). The problem of domination by reason 
and clarificatory injustice therefore also arises in connection with 
certain well-established Wittgenstein-interpretations. 
But there is an alternative to the preceding readings of Wittgenstein 
that can solve the problem. Perhaps the most crucial difference 
between the mentioned readings and this alternative is that, rather than 
construing grammatical rules as the object or target of philosophical 
clarification and statements, as Glock, (Baker and) Hacker and Kenny 
all do, this interpretation regards grammatical rules and statements as 
instruments of philosophical clarification or as clarificatory devices. On 
this account, Wittgensteinian philosophical statements are not 
statements of grammatical truths or facts regarding the rules which 
allegedly govern our use of language and concepts, and which speakers 
or the users of the concepts in question could be forced to agree with. 
Instead, grammatical rules and statements are instruments by means of 
which complex conceptual relations or logical possibilities and 
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necessities can be clarified, without claiming that such rules or 
statements capture those relations, possibilities and necessities exactly 
as they are. Hence, Wittgensteinian grammatical rules or statements, 
and other philosophical models or modes of representation (such as 
simple language-games or what might be called “natural historical 
pictures”; see Kuusela 2019 for discussion) may simplify and idealize. 
Instead of being claimed to capture the use of relevant words exactly 
as it is, whereby they would account for all cases falling under relevant 
concepts without exception, as traditional philosophical theses are 
intended to do, such clarifications are intended to bring into focus 
specific aspects of our concepts, with a view to addressing particular 
philosophical problems. 
With regard to the possibility of idealization without falsification it 
is important that Wittgenstein rejects as confused the abstract notion 
of the completeness of clarifications, according to which a 
philosophical clarification should contain an answer to every possible 
problem or unclarity that might arise about a concept or issue under 
examination. Since new problems can always be raised and imagined, 
this criterion of the completeness of clarifications is in principle 
impossible to satisfy (AWL, 21; TS 220, §114/Z §440; cf. MS 115, 50–
52). Instead, a clarification “only” needs to be able to clarify whatever 
is relevant for the resolution of the particular philosophical problems 
that are discussed, whereby what counts as relevant is determined with 
reference to the problems in question or whatever is at stake in the 
discussion. A clarification is then complete, when it clarifies whatever 
is relevant from the point of view of resolving the problems in 
question. Accordingly, insofar as a clarification captures what is 
relevant for the discussion, it is not problematic for it to simplify and 
idealize, for example, to present as sharp a distinction that is only 
unclearly indicated in the use of natural language or in everyday speech 
(PI: §77). As long as an idealized grammatical model captures whatever 
is relevant for the discussion at hand, it does not falsify anything in that 
context. 
Provided this sketch of an alternative to Glock’s, Baker and 
Hacker’s and Kenny’s interpretations of the logical role or function of 
grammatical statements, let us now turn to how this account of 
grammatical statements as instruments of clarification enables us to 
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explain the notion of agreement in Wittgenstein very differently from 
Glock and (Baker and) Hacker, and how this helps to solve the 
problem of domination by reason and clarificatory injustice. As I hope 
to make clear, this reading can bring down to earth Wittgenstein’s very 
difficult to understand statement that philosophy only states what 
everyone grants to it, rendering it both comprehensible and sensible 
(PI: §599).  
3. Wittgenstein on agreement in philosophy 
Wittgenstein’s view of agreement in philosophy is intended to take 
seriously the task of philosophy as clarification. This precludes the 
clarifier from assuming that what she finds problematic about an issue 
is exactly the same as what the interlocutor finds problematic, and 
therefore that a clarification that clarifies matters to the clarifier herself 
should necessarily clarify them to the interlocutor too. Rather, what 
exactly is the problem, and what helps to solve it, is something to be 
worked out in a discussion and agreed upon. (Of course, this does not 
exclude the possibility of sharing problems or that a clarification that 
helps one person could help another one.) This has the consequence 
that something not agreed upon does not qualify as a philosophical, 
clarificatory statement. Rather, what counts as clarification is defined 
by its clarificatory effect. As Wittgenstein explains: “An explanation of 
words has clarificatory value for the person to whom it clarifies 
something, upon whom it has a clarifying effect. Independently of that 
it is not an explanation” (MS 123: 18r; from 1940). According to 
Wittgenstein, therefore, a statement qualifies as a clarification only 
insofar as it actually clarifies something; a clarification is something that 
succeeds as a clarification. What does not clarify, despite intentions to 
do so, is only an attempt at clarification. Relatedly, Wittgenstein 
comments on the difference between his way of philosophizing and 
other philosophers: “The difference between my philosophizing and 
that of others is really: what I write down as preparation for philosophical 
clarification they regard as a philosophical clarification” (MS 136: 41b; 
from 1948; original italics/underlining). Clarifications, as the point can 
be explained, cannot be passively received. Clarification requires that 
the interlocutor thinks for herself, that she works with the clarification 
in order to see how (and whether) what is offered as a clarification 
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actually clarifies matters, and that she comes to agree with the 
clarification on this basis. A clarification cannot be imposed on anyone, 
and still qualify as a clarification. 
This view of what counts as a clarificatory and a philosophical 
statement then entails that in philosophy the very possibility is 
excluded of putting forward theses, in the sense of controversial 
true/false statements to be debated. As Wittgenstein writes in another 
remark on agreement in the Investigations: “If one tried to advance theses 
in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because 
everyone would agree to them” (PI: §128/Ms110: 259; cf. WVC: 183). 
In other words, insofar as a philosophical clarification is something 
agreed upon as successfully clarifying something, theses in the sense of 
controversial true/false statements do not qualify as philosophy. 
Accordingly, as Wittgenstein remarks in the same manuscript where 
Investigations §128 is first drafted: “only when I say what is self-evident 
is it philosophy” (Ms110: 214 /Ts211: 256, from 1931; cf. Ms136: 41b). 
Numerous statements can also be found in Wittgenstein’s lectures 
according to which he is willing put to the side anything not be agreed 
upon. For instance: “I won’t say anything that anyone can dispute. Or 
if anyone does dispute it, I will let that point drop and pass on to say 
something else” (LFM: 22; see 55, 102, 103; AWL: 97). 
Wittgenstein therefore clearly does not intend to make his 
interlocutor accept anything she does not want to accept. But can one 
really take seriously the claim that he would drop any point not agreed 
upon? I believe one can, but only if grammatical rules and statements 
thereof are clearly distinguished from philosophical or grammatical 
theses and understood as instruments or devices of clarification. As 
long as grammatical statements are conceived according to the model 
of statements of “grammatical truths” regarding the rules of language, 
comparable to philosophical theses as the statement of truths about 
necessities, the feeling is bound to persist that Wittgenstein’s statement 
about dropping anything not agreed upon is merely rhetorical and 
ultimately dishonest. Secretly he knows that insofar as the interlocutor 
uses, for example, the word “meaning” in the normal way, she will have 
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to acknowledge the rule “meaning is use” as the description of the 
word’s use. We should expect a universal assent, as Glock says.3 
Let me briefly illustrate the difficulty that arises for a view like 
Glock’s and (Baker and) Hacker’s of making consistent sense of 
Wittgenstein’s view. Similarly to Glock, Hacker writes about 
clarificatory accounts proposed by Wittgenstein, such as the 
conception of an inner mental process as standing in need of outer 
criteria and the conception of mathematical propositions as rules:  
 If challenged, they can be withdrawn, and painstaking description of the 
use of words resumed until it becomes clear that the way we use 
psychological predicates in the third person involves behavioural criteria 
for their application, and that the characteristic employment of 
mathematical propositions is normative (Hacker 2001: 334).  
According to this account, the end result, or what will be agreed 
upon, is already known to the philosopher in advance of the 
clarificatory discussion and investigation of the matter together with 
the interlocutor. The discussion will be resumed until agreement about 
the grammatical clarifications has been reached (or clarification is given 
up as futile). But the contrast with Wittgenstein could hardly be starker 
when he says: “I have no right to want you to say that mathematical 
propositions are rules of grammar” (LFM: 55). Wittgenstein does 
indeed propose that the matter be investigated, and this is important. 
As explained a clarification cannot be passively accepted; the 
interlocutor must recognize that it actually clarifies. Unlike Hacker, 
however, Wittgenstein carefully avoids suggesting that the outcome is 
already decided. As the quote evinces, he denies himself the right to want a 
specific outcome.4 
                                                          
3 That the logical function of grammatical statements cannot be understood on the model of 
true theses does not mean that one cannot speak about the truth or correctness of 
clarifications. It only means that their truth or correctness is not to be thought of in terms of 
correspondence with any “grammatical facts” relating to linguistic rules or necessities and 
possibilities concerning language use. For the notion of truth or correctness of clarifications, 
see Kuusela 2019, Chapters 2.3, 3.7, 6.1 and 6.6. 
4 In this connection, Wittgenstein’s exact wording in PI: §599 is important. As Kenny points 
out (2004: 173), according to Wittgenstein philosophy only says what everyone agrees upon, 
not what everyone should agree upon, as Glock and Hacker maintain. This is an important 
observation, but as indicated earlier, Kenny’s interpretation does not seem able to explain 
Wittgenstein’s view. 
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The suspicion that Wittgenstein cannot really mean that he would 
give up his statements about grammar is dissipated as soon as such 
statements are understood as instruments or devices of clarification. 
This adjustment – which amounts to swapping one picture of the role 
of grammatical or philosophical statements for another – transforms 
the whole situation. Crucially, from the point of view according to 
which grammatical rules or models constitute instruments of 
clarification, dropping a statement not agreed upon does not emerge as 
equivalent to abandoning an important “grammatical truth”. Rather, 
this is analogous to exchanging one tool for another more suitable for 
a task at hand. When viewed in the light of this picture, Wittgenstein’s 
readiness to drop any grammatical remarks not agreed upon begins to 
sound not only comprehensible, but sensible, as can now be outlined. 
Which clarificatory statements or accounts one can or must employ 
in tackling a problem depends on what exactly those to whom the 
clarification is offered find problematic about the issue. This means 
that in some cases one might not be able to employ certain clarificatory 
statements or accounts because the participants in the discussion find 
those statements problematic. (This kind of variation can be found 
between philosophy departments, for example, with one set of 
assumptions accepted in one department but not another.) In such a 
case, the clarifier has to find other means to address the issue at hand. 
Hence, as this illustrates, in selecting the right instruments for 
clarification one must also take into account the interlocutors’ 
intellectual backgrounds, i.e., the philosophical convictions that 
provide a background for the problem(s) at hand, and constitute a 
context in which it is (they are) to be resolved. Now a readiness to drop 
clarificatory statements, if they are not agreed upon, then emerges as a 
readiness to respond to a clarificatory task as required by its specific 
circumstances. It does not amount to holding no views about grammar 
or philosophical questions. But it is not a matter of overconfidence 
about others having to come to acknowledge certain clarifications of 
grammar either. These are both false options. (Glock 1991 rejects the 
first option and embraces the second one.) 
Indeed, the outlined view is perfectly compatible with realism in 
philosophy, i.e. the view that things are as they are quite independently 
of us, and that there is such a thing as truth and getting things or 
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grammar right or wrong. As Wittgenstein himself notes about realism 
as a philosophical aim, “Not empiricism and yet realism in philosophy, 
that is the hardest thing” (RFM VI: §23/MS 164: 67). To be sure, 
Wittgenstein’s non-empiricist realism is not a version of naïve realism 
where we, so to speak, read out of our objects of investigation how we 
should conceptualize and think about them. Our concepts do not 
simply reflect reality but they are also expressions of our interests and 
concerns, as Wittgenstein notes. “Concepts lead us to make 
investigations; are the expression of our interest and direct our 
interest” (PI: §570). 
The relevant point for the present discussion is that, as regards 
philosophical methodology, we are not entitled to assume that reality 
is as simple as our theses or models of it represent is as being. Reality 
may be more complex than our representations, as the problems 
relating to the philosophers’ assumption of simple conceptual unity 
show (cf. section 1). Consequently, we ought not to expect – naïvely 
or arrogantly – that reality will neatly conform to our philosophical 
accounts, or claim that such accounts show how things must be in 
reality in the sense which a philosophical thesis claims to capture a 
necessity pertaining to reality. However, to emphasize, what is at stake 
here is not an ontological thesis about the inexhaustible complexity of 
reality, i.e. claim about the nature of reality as more complex than our 
models can account for. This would contradict the view spelt out here, 
and smuggle in a philosophical thesis about the nature of reality. 
Instead, the point is merely methodological and negative, relating to 
the philosophers’ problematic habit of imposing philosophical models 
onto reality or language use in the form of claims about how things 
must be. Such claims involve running together a philosophical model 
and its object, whereby a necessity characteristic and constitutive of a 
philosophical model is confused with a necessity found in reality or in 
actual language use (PI: §§104, 114; see Kuusela 2019, Chapters 4.4–
4.5 for discussion). 
Instead, as Wittgenstein explains, philosophical models in terms of 
which we seek to clarify our concepts, or whatever those concepts 
speak about, are better seen as “objects of comparison”. They are 
models or modes of representation with which reality is compared, not 
only for similarity but also for how it differs from our models. (Note 
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how this highlights the instrumental character of the models.) In other 
words, we ought to see our philosophical accounts as modes of 
representing reality by means of which we seek to render it 
comprehensible, and in terms of which we seek to order or organize it 
for the purpose of clarification. But we should not forget what our 
models are. They are just that, models developed by us with the 
purpose of understanding how things are. Accordingly, the logically 
perspicuous order we seek to bring about is not the order, an ultimate 
metaphysical or logical order of things or language use, as Wittgenstein 
emphasizes (PI: §§122, 130–132). Here we must be careful, as he keeps 
warning, not to falsify reality by means of our models. A philosophical 
model “[…] is supposed to be a picture with which we compare reality, 
through which we represent how things are. Not a picture by which we 
falsify reality” (MS 183: 163–164/PPO 97; from 1937; see Kuusela 
2008a: 121–122 for further discussion of this quote). We run the risk 
of falsifying reality, however, if we expect that our objects of 
investigation, including the rules according to which language is used, 
should neatly correspond to our models, and project those models 
onto reality, or onto our interlocutors’ thinking, in the capacity of 
claims or theses about the rules governing her language use.5 
4. The problem of domination and injustice: What is one 
expected to agree upon? 
I hope the preceding makes clear how the problem of conceptual 
domination, domination by reason or clarificatory injustice can be 
solved without denying the value of reason or logic, and without 
sacrificing the notions of knowledge and truth in the sense in which 
some forms of relativism might sacrifice them. Since a clarification 
must be agreed to actually clarify, it is not possible to force someone 
to accept a clarification. Naturally, this does not mean that arguments 
could not play an important role in clarification. They can, for example, 
                                                          
5 “Reality” is meant to refer here to both, the phenomena of reality as well as the concepts in 
terms of which we speak about those phenomena, whenever the latter are taken as the objects 
of clarification. In the capacity of objects of clarification/investigation, our concepts, or the 
uses of language in which they find their expression, constitute a part of reality as opposed to 
the modes of representation in terms of which we seek to clarify them. The distinction between 
an object and means of representation is relative and dynamic (not absolute and static) in this 
sense. 
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be used to clarify the consequences or presuppositions of a view. 
However, that they have successfully done so is still subject to 
agreement which might be granted or refused. Arguments, and the 
examination of logical presuppositions and consequences does not 
somehow take us beyond the need to agree on clarifications. 
I hope it is now also clear how the outlined account of 
Wittgenstein’s clarificatory practice manages to bring down to earth the 
notion of agreement in his philosophy. According to the proposed 
interpretation, his claim is not, pace Glock and (Baker and) Hacker, that 
there are remarkable kind of statements that everyone who adheres to 
a certain practices of language use must agree upon on pain of 
irrationality. It is not, in this sense, of the essence of grammatical 
statements that they will – eventually, necessarily – be recognized and 
agreed upon by all rational beings or language users equipped with 
relevant concepts. Indeed, since neither Wittgenstein nor any 
Wittgensteinians have actually produced any statements that are both 
readily recognizable as philosophical and agreed upon by everyone (cf. 
Kenny’s point), it is hard to see why the idea that there must be such 
statements should not be characterized as a theoretical postulate of 
certain Wittgensteinians, such as the mentioned scholars. Indeed, as far 
as postulates go, this one certainly seems controversial and implausible, 
given the almost seventy years since the publication of the Philosophical 
Investigations that Wittgensteinians have had to come up with 
grammatical statements agreed upon by philosophers and other 
language users generally. I see no essential difference between the fact 
of disagreement about Wittgensteinian grammatical statements and 
about traditional philosophical theses; Wittgensteinians do not seem to 
have been more successful than philosophers traditionally in forcing 
others to agree with their statements.6 
Instead of postulating such extraordinary statements that 
interlocutors will have to agree with, we can simply maintain that to 
agree on a grammatical statement is to agree in the context of some 
specific discussion or discussions that the philosopher’s clarificatory 
statement is capable of clarifying some aspect of the matter at hand to 
                                                          
6 For discussion of Wittgenstein and the issue of disagreement in philosophy with regard to 
the question of what might explain persistent disagreement in philosophy, and why 
disagreement would be better acknowledged as part of philosophy rather than gotten rid of, 
see Kuusela 2017. 
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some extent. Thus, one is not expected to accept grammatical 
statements in the abstract, without reference to specific clarificatory 
goals. Clarifications are only offered in response to particular actual 
problems or unclarities, and this is the context in which they can be 
agreed upon or rejected. Importantly, this also makes grammatical 
clarifications much easier to agree upon than is the case from the point 
of view of Glock’s and (Baker and) Hacker’s account. What one is 
asked to agree upon is not a statement concerning a definitive 
grammatical order, an order that must be recognized as underlying 
language use. (Such a definitive order is not what Wittgenstein means 
by “perspicuous (re)presentation”; see PI §122 and Kuusela 2008: 
228ff. for discussion.) Instead, agreement only constitutes an 
acknowledgement that a clarification has succeeded in clarifying certain 
specific issues under discussion, while it is left open that other 
clarificatory models might be needed in the context of the discussion 
of other problems relating to the same concepts or cases, or when we 
turn our attention to other cases that fall under the same concepts. By 
way of quick illustration, although Wittgenstein’s conception of 
language as a game according to rules may be helpful in clarifying 
certain aspects of the concept of linguistic meaning, it does not seem 
very helpful with regard to certain other issues relating to linguistic 
meaning, such as the relevance of sound for meaning in the case of 
poetic language use. Here associations relating to sounds play a role, 
unlike in cases where meaning depends on rules for use. But insofar as 
meaning depends on rules, the sound of words is irrelevant for their 
meaning (cf. AWL: 104; for further discussion, see Kuusela 2019, 
Chapter 6.5). 
Accordingly, it is misleading to conceive grammatical statements as 
stating “grammatical truths” that must be recognized on pain of 
irrationality by all users of those concepts, as suggested by Glock’s and 
(Baker and) Hacker’s picture of the necessary acceptance of 
grammatical statements on pain of irrationality. As argued, grammatical 
statements are instruments employed to resolve particular 
philosophical problems and unclarities in particular historical contexts. 
Since what needs to be said about a philosophical issue is whatever is 
relevant for resolving the particular problems and unclarities that one 
is concerned with, and different things may be relevant from the point 
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of view of different problems relating to one and the same object of 
investigation, different things might be said about an object of 
investigation in different contexts of discussion. But this does not 
mean that just anything could be helpfully said. Nor does it mean that 
there is not a way that things are, as if the facts pertaining to reality or 
language use depended on those who seek to clarify them, on what we 
find problematic or interesting. Wittgensteinian pluralism of 
clarifications is therefore compatible with knowledge and truth and 
there being an objective independent reality. Accordingly, the view is 
clearly distinguished from relativism in the sense of a thesis that denies 
the possibility of knowledge, truth, logic, and objectivity.  
5. Who is clarifying what to whom? 
Let me now raise a question about the authority of a philosopher as a 
clarifier. Does the philosopher occupy here some kind of authoritative 
position as opposed to the interlocutor? As I have argued, the 
proposed interpretation of the concept of agreement in Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy can successfully remove a certain air of implausibility or 
disingenuousness that surrounds his remarks about agreement on the 
interpretations of Glock and (Baker and) Hacker. Nevertheless, it is 
important that the preceding description of the practice of clarification 
remains idealized in certain respects. Rather than revealing a problem 
with Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy or with the proposed 
interpretation of it, however, this is indicative of the logical status of 
the proposed account. 
It is not true that in real life the roles of the participants in a 
philosophical discussion would be as neatly delineated as portrayed 
above. In actuality the roles of philosopher and interlocutor in the 
sense of the provider and recipient of clarifications respectively can 
rarely be identified with specific participants in a discussion. Indeed, if 
the participants in the discussion are to learn from one another, and 
the relation between them is not a one-directional relation of 
instruction, their roles cannot be assumed to be fixed in this way. It is 
crucial, then, that the preceding depiction is not intended as an 
empirically accurate factual description. Rather, it constitutes a 
simplified model which is itself to be used as an object of comparison 
in accordance with Wittgenstein’s philosophical methodology. The 
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purpose of the model is to spell out a way of conceiving philosophical 
discussion and the participants’ roles in it, and to introduce in this way 
order and perspicuity into the actual blurred reality of philosophical 
discourse, where the participants in a discussion may actually occupy 
either the role of the philosopher or interlocutor, and switch between 
these roles. 
The point of conceiving philosophical discussion in this way is that 
it solves certain problems relating to the philosopher’s role, in 
particular the problem of domination by reason and the philosopher 
doing injustice to the interlocutor by imposing views on her as 
something she allegedly must accept. As Wittgenstein also says about 
the task of philosophy: “Our only task is to be just. That is, we must 
only point out and resolve the injustices of philosophy, and not posit 
new parties—and creeds” (TS 213: 420/PO: 181; cf. PI: §131). It is 
plausible that he is referring here to philosophical parties as defined by 
their theses about how things must be, concerning the necessary 
features of our objects of investigation. He himself, on the other hand 
does not trade in such theses, but merely employs philosophical 
definitions, grammatical rules and other models as instruments of 
clarification. Consequently, because it is characteristic of Wittgenstein’s 
use of relevant kinds of models that they can be withdrawn if not 
agreed upon, there is no need to insist on any statements of grammar 
in the context of Wittgenstein’s approach. With the disappearance of 
the need to insist on the acceptance of any clarifications, the problem 
of injustice also disappears. In this sense the requirement of agreement 
is to be regarded as part of Wittgenstein’s design for a method that can 
dissolve the problem of injustice in philosophy.7 
Another sense in which Wittgenstein’s conception of the status of 
philosophical remarks is idealized is the following. If one interprets his 
remark, that only what is agreed upon or self-evident qualifies as a 
philosophical statement, as a thesis about what a philosophical 
statement must be or is by nature, very little of what is said when 
philosophy is actually practiced qualifies as philosophical. More often 
than not philosophers disagree. Wittgenstein’s statement, therefore, 
                                                          
7 Of course, an interlocutor may falsely accept a wrong characterization of her concepts or 
what those concepts concern. But this is no longer a matter of a philosopher doing injustice 
to her views. Here the interlocutor is misconstruing them herself, and ultimately nothing 
excludes the possibility of finite beings falling into such errors. 
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seems to express a very strict view of philosophy unable to 
accommodate what most philosophers would regard as “philosophical 
statements”. However, this problem disappears, just like the problem 
of the empirical inaccuracy of his characterization of the philosopher’s 
and the interlocutor’s roles, when the statement is understood as 
articulating a philosophical model to be used as an object of 
comparison. This means that the view of philosophical statements as 
self-evident and agreed upon does not constitute a thesis to which 
every legitimate philosophical statement must conform. Rather, it is a 
defining characteristic of Wittgenstein’s account of philosophy, a 
principle according to which the activity of clarification is to be carried 
out. In philosophical clarification agreement must be sought, and only 
what actually clarifies ultimately counts as a clarification, as opposed to 
attempted clarifications. This is what clarifications are on the model in 
the light of which Wittgenstein proposes to understand the discipline 
of philosophy. The justification of this model of philosophy, in turn, 
depends on the philosophical work it can do, i.e. on the problems it 
can solve, such as the problem of domination by reason, conceptual 
domination or clarificatory injustice – or the problem of dogmatism or 
of the justification of philosophical statements (see Kuusela 2008a and 
2019). Thus, Wittgenstein’s account of the logical role of philosophical 
statements as something that need to be agreed upon is neither a thesis 
about the nature of philosophical statements nor an arbitrary 
stipulation. 
In this connection it is noteworthy that according to Wittgenstein, 
the activity of clarification or philosophy consists not only of making 
statements but also, for instance, of asking questions. As he remarks:  
 In philosophy it is always good to put a question instead of an answer to a 
question. For an answer to the philosophical question may easily be unjust; 
disposing of it by means of another question is not. (MS 122: 14r/RFM: 
147; cf. AWL: 97f.)  
If agreement is interpreted as a requirement that everything we say in 
philosophy must satisfy, asking questions would not qualify as 
philosophizing. Or at most, rhetorical questions would qualify. This 
supports the view that Wittgenstein does not intend the requirement 
of agreement as a thesis that everything said in philosophy must meet, 
a highly controversial and implausible claim in itself. This thesis would 
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give rise to contradictions in Wittgenstein’s account of philosophy that 
are too obvious to attribute to him. 
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